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Imagine-self perspective-taking and Nash behavior 
 
This is a preliminary version (from early 2016) of the further paper “Karbowski A and Ramsza M (2017) 
Imagine-Self Perspective-Taking and Rational Self-Interested Behavior in a Simple Experimental Normal-Form 
Game. Front. Psychol. 8:1557. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01557”. The latter publication was supported by 
National Science Centre, Poland (grant number UMO-2016/21/B/HS4/03016). 
 




We hypothesize that introduction of imagine-self perspective-taking by decision-makers promotes Nash choices 
in a simple experimental normal-form game. In particular, we examined behavior of 404 undergraduate students 
in the experimental game, in which row player can suffer a monetary loss only if (1) she plays her Nash 
equilibrium pure strategy and (2) the other player plays her dominated pure strategy. Results suggest that the 
threat of suffering monetary losses effectively discourages the row players from choosing Nash equilibrium 
strategy. The row players can rationally take the possibility of playing dominated strategy by column players into 
account. The column players can play dominated strategy either because of their not full rationality or their 
specific not self-interested motivation. However, adopting imagine-self perspective by the row players seems to 
effectively shorten the psychological distance between them and the column players, alleviate attributing (by row 
players) (i) a susceptibility to errors (ii) and/or some non-self-interested motivations to the column players and in 
effect promote Nash equilibrium choices in the proposed experimental game. The imagine-self-self-interest link 
is further postulated and succinctly discussed in the context of relevant psychological and economic literature. 
 




     Weizsäcker (2003) coined the hypothesis that decision-makers’ tendency to ignore their 
opponents’ incentives in experimental normal-form games is an artefact of the experimental 
environments in the laboratories, and in particular of the use of abstract payoff matrix 
presentations in experimental procedures. Weizsäcker (2003) further suggests that adding a 
context to the experiments (and probably developing a more realistic sense of strategic 
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choice) would help the subjects to perceive their opponents’ decision problems more vividly 
and clearer. From the viewpoint of game-theoretic models of quantal response (see e.g. 
McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) the subjects’ tendency to ignore their opponents’ incentives can 
be referred to as an anomaly (Weizsäcker, 2003). In these models it is usually assumed that 
players are aware of the level of randomness in their opponents’ motivations (Weizsäcker, 
2003). However, the game play data seem to consistently reject the above-mentioned 
assumption (cf. Weizsäcker, 2003). 
     The following article addresses the outlined behavioral “anomaly” of ignoring rationality 
of others in experimental normal-form games. In particular, we set out to investigate whether 
the subjects’ tendency to ignore their opponents’ incentives in a simple experimental normal-
form game can be alleviated due to introduction of imagine-self perspective-taking by 
decision-makers. To this end, we examined subjects’ behavior in a simple experimental 
normal-form game (for details, see section 2), in which one of the two players (row player) 
can suffer a monetary loss only if (1) she plays her Nash equilibrium (pure) strategy and (2) 
the other player (column player) plays her dominated (pure) strategy. 
     We hypothesize that introduction of imagine-self perspective-taking by decision-makers 
promotes Nash choices in the outlined game. In particular, we expect that adopting imagine-
self perspective by the row player shortens the psychological distance (Liberman et al., 2007) 
between her and the column player1. In consequence, the column player may appear to her 
more similar (similarity is one of the forms of psychological distance, see Liviatan et al., 
2006). If so, “psychologically closer” individual may seem to decision-maker more likely to 
be rational, which is how decision-makers tend to perceive themselves (see e.g. Rawls, 1971; 
O’Neill, 1998; Hendrikse, 2003; Hollis, 2013). As a result, row player’s confidence that the 
opponent will play her dominant strategy may rise and so the number of Nash choices made 
by row players in our experiment. 
     In his seminal work on psychological perspectives on another’s situation, Stotland (1969) 
distinguished two different forms of perspective taking, i.e. (1) imagine-self and (2) imagine-
other. Imagine-self perspective means imagining what one’s own thoughts and emotions 
would be if one were in the situation of the other person (Batson, 2014). According to Grohn 
and others (2014) imagine-self mindset is related to the often documented (see Marks and 
Miller, 1987) false-consensus bias (false-consensus effect) where experimental subjects tend 
to believe that others are similar to them. Imagine-other perspective translates in turn to 
 
1 For more studies on psychological distance and behavior in experimental games, see e.g. Aguiar et al., 2008; 
Kim et al., 2013. More on the topic can be also found in discussion section. 
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imagining the thoughts and emotions of the other person (Batson, 2014). Stotland (1969) 
found that both above-mentioned forms of imagining lead to increased emotional arousal in 
comparison to adopting emotionally cool, objective perspective (Batson, 2014). Batson and 
others (1997) report that imagine-self perspective-taking produces both self-oriented and 
other-oriented (empathic) emotions in decision-makers. Imagine-other perspective-taking 
seems in turn to produce solely other-oriented empathic concern (Batson, 2014). 
     As Grohn, Huck and Valasek (2014) notice, the concept of empathy despite its importance 
in Humean (1739) and Smithian2 (1759) philosophical enunciations has never gained a decent 
foothold in economic theory. Grohn and others (2014) showed that empathy should be 
perceived as a distinct psychological mechanism that affects both belief and utility formation 
in strategic decision-making. In the presence of empathy, beliefs and utility become 
intricately linked, even minor manipulations of beliefs may change player’s utility. Grohn and 
others (2014) suggest that empathy, among other functions, is a cognitive tool that allows to 
produce inferences about the other’s beliefs in a strategic context, and so to predict another 
player’s choice. 
     Psychological research (Batson, 2011) indicates strong links between imagine-other 
perspective-taking and altruistic behavior, links that are not present when decision-makers 
adopt imagine-self perspective (Grohn et al., 2014). The following study shows in fact that the 
imagine-self perspective-taking may be linked to Nash equilibrium behavior of decision-
makers. Batson (2011) suggests that imagining others triggers helping behavior of individuals 
due to (i) pure need to help others, (ii) need to reduce personal tension over suffering of 
others, (iii) fear of social sanctions or (iv) drive for social rewards. As Grohn and others 
(2014) note, Batson (2011) demonstrates how helping behavior remains a stable phenomenon 
even if channels ii, iii and iv are shut down, supporting the empathy-altruism hypothesis. 
     According to Batson (2011) the key route to trigger altruistic behavior in humans is to 
adopt imagine-other perspective. Since empathic emotions are induced by both imagine-other 
and imagine-self perspective-taking, the empathy-altruism hypothesis refers in fact to 
imagine-other-altruism hypothesis. Then, since Nash equilibrium concept is believed to model 
self-interested behavior of decision-makers involved (Cohen, 1998), and the following study 
links imagine-self perspective-taking to Nash equilibrium behavior, the imagine-self-self-
 
2 Both imagine-self and imagine-other perspective-taking refer to high-level cognitive processes described by 
Adam Smith as mindreading (1759). Mindreading is today defined as people’s ability to infer what others think 
or feel (Batson, 2009; Grohn et al., 2014). Smith stressed that these high-level processes are deliberate, what 
stands in contrast to Hume’s (1739) conception of empathy understood as automatic assessing of others (thus 
close to interpersonal mimicry, see e.g. Lakin et al., 2003; Iacoboni, 2009). 
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interest hypothesis could be considered. In consequence, it is not excluded that empathy-
behavior link extensively discussed in philosophical and psychological literature (cf. Maibom, 
2014) can be decomposed not only into (1) imagine-other-altruism hypothesis (see e.g. 
Batson, 2011), but also, at least under some specific circumstances, into (2) imagine-self-self-
interest hypothesis. 
     The implications of empathy-altruism hypothesis (in fact, imagine-other-altruism 
hypothesis) for strategic choice have been rigorously investigated by Grohn and others 
(2014). These authors explored the possibility that decision-makers who are more 
sophisticated when it comes to evaluating the preferences of others are also more prone to 
have other-regarding preferences. Grohn and others (2014) hypothesized that decision-makers 
who adopt imagine-other perspective have more accurate beliefs than purely selfish players. 
On the basis of three toy games (a public good game, an ultimatum game and a battle of the 
sexes game) the authors showed that decision-makers with other-regarding preferences have 
more accurate beliefs of other players’ types (a low-empathy (L) or a high-empathy (H) 
type)3, and are therefore “better” strategic players. From the viewpoint of our paper, the most 
interesting is the analysis of battle of the sexes game play data and, in particular, the fact that 
the expected coordination between types L and H is higher than between two H types (Grohn 
et al., 2014). The authors explain this rather counterintuitive result by the use of imagine-self 
perspective by type L. Imagine-self perspective-taking works as a credible commitment 
device to play type L’s preferred option at a higher-than-equilibrium rate, causing a player of 
type H to yield and play her less-preferred option (Grohn et al., 2014). It seems consistent 
with our experimental results, where adoption of imagine-self perspective by the row player 
increases probability of playing Nash equilibrium strategy by her. 
     The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We describe participants, materials and 
experimental procedure in section 2. The results presented and analyzed in section 3 are then 





     To test expectations elaborated upon in the previous section an experiment was designed 
and conducted. The experimental procedure comprised a single two-player normal-form 
 
3 More game-theoretic analyses on players’ beliefs of other players’ types can be found e.g. in Stahl and Wilson 
(1994; 1995) and Huck and Weizsäcker (2002). 
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game. The game was presented to four experimental groups of subjects numbering about one 
hundred subjects each (for details, see the next section). Each group, prior to solving the 
game, was given different instructions (the set of instructions given to subjects is presented 
further in this section). 
 
Participants 
     Participants of the experiment were 404 undergraduate students of Warsaw School of 
Economics (SGH). In particular first year and second year students participated in the 
experiment. During first year of studies at Warsaw School of Economics students do not 
choose any particular profile of studies (in order to complete a bachelor’s degree students 
major in one of the taught disciplines, ranging from business and economics studies, through 
decision sciences and information systems to political science and international relations). 
 
Materials and experimental procedure 
     During the experiment the following two-player normal-form game was used. 
 
Table 1. The normal-form game used in the experiment. 
 L R 
T 600; 600 -300; 500 
B 500; 600 300; 500 
Source: own material. 
 
     Because participants did not have any prior knowledge about games, a short (about 10 
minutes) tutorial on how a game is played was given at the beginning of the procedure. It was 
then checked that the participants understood a concept of a strategy and payoff. The subjects 
were told to think of numbers in table 1 as if they were monetary amounts in euros4 that the 
participants can gain (positive payoffs) or lose (negative payoffs) depending on the decisions 
taken in the game. 
     After the tutorial participants were given randomly chosen versions of printed instructions 
(one of four versions, see table 2) with the normal-form game. The solving of the game by 
participants was not time-limited, and on average it took a participant about 3 minutes to 
indicate her/his choice. The printed instructions were next collected and the results were 
computed in a spreadsheet application. 
 
4 These are significant monetary values for the SGH undergraduate students. E.g. 500 euros cover average 
monthly living expenses of the SGH undergraduate students. 
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     Note that the above game (see table 1) is solvable through the process of iterative 
elimination of the strictly dominated strategies. It is easy to see that the R (right-hand) 
strategy of a column player is strictly dominated by the L (left-hand) strategy. Once the R 
strategy is eliminated the B (bottom) strategy of a row player becomes strictly dominated. As 
a result there is a single strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium (T5, L). 
     There were four experimental groups numbering about one hundred participants each. 
Each group was given different instructions. These instructions are provided below. 
 
Table 2. Experimental instructions. 
Group number Instructions given 
1 You are a row player (you choose between T and B). Indicate your choice by 
underlining one of the following strategies:   T   or   B. 
2 You are a column player (you choose between L and R). Indicate your choice 
by underlining one of the following strategies:   L   or   R. 
3 You are a row player (you choose between T and B). Before you make your 
choice, what would be your choice if you were a column player:   L   or   R 
(indicate your choice be underlining). Now make choice for yourself:   T   or   
B (indicate by underlining). 
4 You are a column player (you choose between L and R). Before you make your 
choice, what would be your choice if you were a row player:   T   or   B 
(indicate your choice by underlining). Now make choice for yourself:   L   or   
R (indicate by underlining). 
Source: own material. 
 
     The above instructions are constructed in such a way as to test how behavior of a given 
player, either row or column, varies as the player is guided to consider choices of an 
opponent. As with imagine-self perspective-taking people try to imagine themselves in other 
people’s shoes, instructions given to groups 3 and 4 are intended to induce imagine-self 





5 T stands for top. 
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     The results of the experiment are given in table 3. Observe that for the first two (compare 
table 2) experimental groups only one strategy is to be selected (one choice is to be made), but 
for the last two experimental groups two strategies make up an answer (two choices are to be 
made by participants) and so there are four possibilities. 
 
Table 3. Received results. 
Strategy chosen Number of participants 
that chose the given 
strategy 
Relative frequency of the 
given choice 
 Group 1  
T 39 0.371 
B 66 0.629 
 Group 2  
L 94 0.904 
R 10 0.096 
 Group 3  
TL6 56 0.583 
TR 1 0.010 
BL 33 0.344 
BR 6 0.063 
 Group 4  
TL 36 0.364 
TR 3 0.030 
BL 58 0.586 
BR 2 0.020 
Source: own material. 
 
     Some of the results seem fairly clear. In the first experimental group only about 37 per cent 
of subjects chose strategy T and about 63 per cent went with a choice of strategy B. This 
result seems not even close to the unique strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the 
presented game. There is, however, no surprise (from the viewpoint of sufficiently rational 
and self-interested subjects) in results within the second group. Almost all (over 90 per cent) 
 
6 The two-letters notation indicates participants’ choices made in the third and fourth experimental groups. 
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participants of the second group chose the dominant strategy L. Only 10 out of 104 subjects 
chose the dominated strategy R. In the third experimental group over 90 per cent of subjects 
chose the optimal (Nash equilibrium) strategy for a column player (strategy L) and at the 
same time about 59 per cent of subjects chose the Nash equilibrium strategy T. This share is 
visibly higher than in the first experimental group (about 59 per cent in the third group to 
about 37 per cent in the first one). In the fourth experimental group about 95 per cent of 
subjects chose the optimal strategy of a column player (in comparison to about 90 per cent in 
the second group, respectively). Within the fourth experimental group about 39 per cent of 
subjects chose the Nash equilibrium strategy of a row player (in comparison to 37 per cent in 
the first group, respectively). 
     In this study we decided to formulate the following research hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
In the first experimental group a proportion of subjects choosing a strategy B is higher 
than a proportion of subjects choosing a strategy T. 
Hypothesis 2 
A proportion of subjects choosing T in the third experimental group is higher than a 
proportion of subjects choosing B in the third experimental group. 
Hypothesis 3 
A proportion of subjects choosing T in the third experimental group is higher than a 
proportion of subjects choosing T in the first experimental group. 
Hypothesis 4 
A proportion of subjects choosing L in the third experimental group is higher than a 
proportion of subjects choosing R in the third experimental group. 
Hypothesis 5 
A proportion of subjects choosing TL in the third experimental group is higher than a 
proportion of subjects choosing BL in the third experimental group. 
Hypothesis 6 
A proportion of subjects choosing L in the second experimental group is higher than a 
proportion of subjects choosing R in the second experimental group. 
Hypothesis 7 
A proportion of subjects choosing strategy L in the fourth experimental group is higher 




A proportion of subjects choosing L in the fourth experimental group is equal to a 
proportion of subjects choosing L in the second experimental group. 
Hypothesis 9 
A proportion of subjects choosing L in the second experimental group is higher than a 
proportion of subjects choosing T in the first experimental group. 
 
     Observe that in our simple experimental normal-form game the row player can suffer a 
monetary loss only if (1) she plays her Nash equilibrium (pure) strategy T and (2) the other 
player plays her dominated (pure) strategy R. We believe that the threat of suffering monetary 
losses can effectively discourage the row players from choosing strategy T in the first 
experimental group. The row players can rationally take the possibility of playing strategy R 
by column players into account. The column players can play strategy R either because of 
their not full rationality (and so the column players may e.g. do not understand the decision 
problem completely or make mistakes in solving it or indicating their choices) or their 
specific not self-interested motivation. However, in the third experimental group adopting 
imagine-self perspective by the row players may effectively shorten the psychological 
distance between them and the column players, alleviate attributing (by row players) (i) a 
susceptibility to errors (ii) and/or some non-self-interested motivations to the column players 
and in effect promote Nash equilibrium choices made by the row decision-makers. The above 
reasoning stands behind hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
     Since in our study the column players are not faced with the threat of suffering monetary 
losses, the adopting imagine-self perspective by the column decision-makers should not 
change much in their choices. L should be a desirable strategy no matter how the row player 
is perceived. This reasoning stands behind hypotheses 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
     For testing about a single proportion an exact test of the statistical significance of 
deviations from a theoretically expected distribution of observations into two categories was 
used (binomial test), and for testing about two proportions a permutation (randomization) test 
was used. The p-values reported in table 4 refer to null hypotheses given in footnotes while 
decisions refer to research hypotheses. 









Table 4. Test results. 
Hypothesis number P-value Hypothesis 
1 0.0054097 not rejected 
2 0.04118 not rejected 
3 0.0012632219 not rejected 
4 2.2e-1610 not rejected 
5 0.00959311 not rejected 
6 2.2e-1612 not rejected 
7 2.2e-1613 not rejected 
8 0.285425314 not rejected 
9 1.506029e-1615 not rejected 




     We believe that at least two causes may stand behind the observed behavior of row players 
in the first experimental group (the majority of the row players in the first experimental 
condition select strategy B). As already mentioned, the row players may choose non-Nash 
equilibrium strategy because of rational expectations that (i) the column player is not fully 
 
7 Null hypothesis: probability of choosing strategy T is 0.5. Alternative hypothesis: probability of choosing 
strategy T is smaller than 0.5. 
8 Null hypothesis: probability of choosing strategy T is 0.5. Alternative hypothesis: probability of choosing 
strategy T is greater than 0.5. 
9 Null hypothesis: probability of choosing T in the third group is equal to probability of choosing T in the first 
group. Alternative hypothesis: probability of choosing T in the third group is higher than probability of choosing 
T in the first group. 
10 Null hypothesis: probability of choosing L is 0.5. Alternative hypothesis: probability of choosing L is greater 
than 0.5. 
11 Null hypothesis: probability of choosing TL is 0.5. Alternative hypothesis: probability of choosing TL is 
greater than 0.5. 
12 Null hypothesis: probability of choosing L is 0.5. Alternative hypothesis: probability of choosing L is greater 
than 0.5. 
13 Null hypothesis: probability of choosing L is 0.5. Alternative hypothesis: probability of choosing L is greater 
than 0.5. 
14 Null hypothesis: probability of choosing L in the fourth group is equal to probability of choosing L in the 
second group. Alternative hypothesis: probability of choosing L in the fourth group is not equal to probability of 
choosing L in the second group. 
15 Null hypothesis: probability of choosing L in the second group is equal to probability of choosing T in the first 
group. Alternative hypothesis: probability of choosing L in the second group is higher than probability of 
choosing T in the first group. 
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rational or (ii) is motivated to act in a not self-interested manner. The latter can be at least 
partially explained by social value orientation (SVO) theory (McClintock, 1972; Griesinger 
and Livingston, 1973). The row player may know that the column player can exhibit 
competitive orientation and so seek for a maximization of her relative gain. Note that 
selecting strategy R by the column player may mean in fact sacrificing risk-free 100 euros to 
inflict losses on the row player. The self-interested column decision-maker should instead 
select strategy L in order to maximize her individual gain. 
     The row player may also take the possibility of mistake made by the (even self-interested) 
column player into account. In neoclassical economics full rationality means that the ratio of 
decision maker’s cognitive capacities to problem complexity always equals 1 (Hendrikse, 
2003). Consequently, a decision maker is able to immediately solve any problem and makes 
no mistakes. Since this form of rationality is postulative in nature and not realistic (see e.g. 
Selten, 1999), the row players may convincingly take the possibility of errors made by 
column players into account. The column players may at least (i) do not understand the 
decision problem properly, (ii) make mistakes in solving the problem or (iii) make mistakes in 
indicating the desired answer. Simply put, the row players may attribute (even not fully 
consciously) some other form of rationality (other than full rationality) to column players, i.e. 
for example bounded (limited) rationality or procedural rationality (cf. Hendrikse, 2003). 
Bounded rationality occurs when the ratio of decision maker’s cognitive capacities to problem 
complexity is lower than 1 (Simon, 1961). Procedural rationality occurs when the ratio of 
decision maker’s cognitive capacities to problem complexity is nearly zero (Hendrikse, 2003). 
Other than full rationality concepts of rationality allow the possibility of errors made by the 
decision-maker. 
     When we look at the results, we can conclude that in our experimental game the pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium concept does not work well. Note that in game equipped with 
instructions that do not induce imagine-self perspective, the majority of outcomes would be 
(B, L) instead of the single strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium (T, L). The pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium concept works better when assisted with the experimental instructions 
intended to induce imagine-self perspective. In game equipped with such an instruction the 
majority of outcomes would be (T, L). 
     It seems that somehow the imagine-self perspective-taking promotes Nash choices in our 
simple experimental normal-form game. What is the reason for that? How this statistically 
significant difference in results (see e.g. hypotheses 1, 2 and 3) can be explained? One 
possible explanation can be found on the grounds of psychological distance theory. This 
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explanation, though appealing, is not exhaustive and at this stage should be treated as a 
conjecture. We think that adopting imagine-self perspective by the row player shortens the 
psychological distance between her and the column player. An object is more psychologically 
distant as it takes place farther into the future, as it occurs in more remote locations, as it is 
less likely to occur, and as it happens to people less and less like oneself (Trope et al., 2007). 
Cognitive psychologists assume that people mentally construe objects that are psychologically 
not distant in terms of low-level, detailed, and contextualized qualities, whereas at a distance 
they construe the same objects in terms of high-level, abstract, and stable characteristics 
(Trope et al., 2007). Experimental instructions intended to induce imagine-self perspective 
may encourage row players to think about column players not as abstract decision-makers, but 
real people, probably similar to participants at least in some terms. In consequence, the 
column player may appear to the participant “psychologically closer”. If so, “psychologically 
closer” individual may seem to participant more likely to be rational, which is how decision-
makers tend to perceive themselves. As a result, row player’s confidence that the opponent 
will play her dominant strategy may rise and so the number of Nash choices made by row 
players in our experiment. 
     Note that the third (and the fourth) experimental condition could be in fact also perceived 
as a game with oneself, i.e. the decision-maker may “impose herself” (e.g. her own 
preferences) on the other player. Then the column player in the third experimental condition 
may appear to the decision-maker really “psychologically close” and definitely more 
predictable comparing to the first condition. Observe further that (i) a proportion of subjects 
choosing L in the third experimental group is higher than a proportion of subjects choosing R 
in the third experimental group (hypothesis 4) and (ii) a proportion of subjects choosing TL in 
the third experimental group is higher than a proportion of subjects choosing BL in the third 
experimental group (hypothesis 5). If experimental subjects from the third group see 
themselves in the column players and tend to select strategies L and T in the third 
experimental condition, it seems reasonable to suppose that subjects from the third group 
acted in a self-interested and sufficiently rational manner. 
     It is also worth noticing that imagine-self perspective taking by participants allows to 
receive significantly more game results that would be generated in a society consisting of (i) 
sufficiently rational and (ii) self-interested people (pairs of choices – TL). Perhaps then 
imagine-self perspective-taking can act as a specific cognitive device promoting self-
interested behavior of society members in strategic interactions, in the best interest of the 
13 
 
whole society. Imagine-self perspective taking may be then close to this form of Smithian 
mindreading (1759) that assists working of the “invisible hand”. 
     Having briefly discussed in the previous paragraph the imagine-self-self-interest link, it 
remains to comment on the results corresponding to the last four hypotheses. As expected, the 
adopting imagine-self perspective by the column decision-makers does not change much in 
their choices. L remains a desirable strategy no matter how the row player is perceived. 
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